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Abstract  Theories of recognition are an important 
approach for the development and normative foundation of a 
critical social theory. One central thesis is here that the 
formation of a positive personal identity depends on the 
affirmation by others in contexts of mutual recognition and 
that this affirmation is the decisive normative criteria for the 
constitution of social institutions. But insofar as this personal 
identity is in many cases only conceived as an identification 
of the actor with his own qualities and abilities, it follows 
that the social context, in which this positive personal 
identity is achieved, remains arbitrary. The trouble is here 
that the affirmation of a certain personal identity may than 
correspond to the existing expectations of the actor and 
ensure his integrity, but at the same also reaffirm the power 
relations of the social context, in which this identity was 
formed. In the second part of my paper I would like to 
develop an account oriented towards the social philosophy of 
pragmatism, which avoids these problems. Recognizing has 
to be conceived not as an affirmation of an already existing 
identity, but as a social process. In this process the actors and 
social groups are always confronted with unintended social 
consequences of their actions for others and are therefore led 
to a crisis and reformulation of their actual practical identity. 
And this holds not only on the level of the individual, but 
also on that of institutions. The democratic public is the 
realm in which a common elucidation of problematic social 
consequences of the existing institutions takes place. This 
elucidation is then the background for a critical reflection on, 
and a reformulation of the guiding norms of these institutions. 
In consequence critique refers to blockades of this process of 
experience, in which institutionalized rules are questioned 
and reformulated. 




With the concept of recognition Honneth tries to elaborate 
the normative foundations of critique and to connect given 
experiences of injustice and claims for respect with social 
movements and transformations of the whole society. I want 
to show in this paper that these intentions of Honneths theory 
can only be realized, if some of its key-concepts, especially 
that of practical identity, are reformulated and based on other 
foundations. But before I come to this, it may be helpful to 
structure and to summarize this complex program of a 
critical social theory by distinguishing the three following 
points: 
First, Honneths theory includes a concept of social justice. 
The central idea here is, that the possibility of actors to 
achieve within their social relations a positive 
self-conception or a positive practical identity has to count as 
the central criterion to evaluate the justice or injustice of the 
social order in question. This positive practical identity is 
conceived as a result of an identification of the actor with his 
own wishes and abilities. I will say more about this in the 
following part. Second, it is said that such an identification 
and thereby the formation of a positive practical identity is 
only possible if these abilities and wishes of the actors are 
also affirmed or recognized by others. And this affirmation 
must find its expression not only in isolated acts or on the 
level of direct interaction but also on an institutional level (1, 
p57). Third, the normative development of a society is in this 
perspective the result of a conflict, in which social groups 
and movements struggle to fulfil their claims for recognition. 
But the claims for recognition of these social groups and 
movements need to be justified. And such a justification can 
not be based on essential features of the human nature or 
transhistorical norms. Rather, it has to refer to the norms of 
recognition, which are established within a given society. 
These norms, as Honneth interprets them, shape our 
character and whole world-view in such a deep manner, that 
it is nearly impossible to distance ourselves from them. They 
form our practical identities, the way we understand 
ourselves as actors. Love and the satisfaction of needs in the 
sphere of personal relations, respect in the sphere of formal 
rights and social esteem in the sphere of social division of 
labour can count as such norms (2, p168). They define what 
we can legitimatly expect from others within a certain sphere 
of interaction. In this way, the articulation of claims has to be 
justified by showing that accepted norms of recognition are 
not fully realized within a certain context or within a certain 
institution. In consequence, justified critique is here always 
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bound to an already existing normative consensus and it 
seems impossible, that it will overcome it (3, p97). 
In what follows, I will try to reconstruct and to criticize 
these three points of Honneths argumentation (2.) and to 
develop an alternative, inspired by the social philosophy of 
Hegel and its pragmatist reinterpretation (3.). 
2. Honneth's Theory of Recognition 
2.1. Normative Reconstruction 
I will start with Honneths conception of critique. With his 
reconstructive or interpretative conception of critique 
Honneth refers to Horkheimers claim that critique should be 
able to conceive itself as a part of the society it describes (4, 
p257).  From that he draws the conclusion that the 
normative foundations of critique can only be found in the 
norms which are established within the given society and 
accepted by the actors. According to this, critique has to 
show first that these norms form our self-understanding as 
social actors and our claims to others. Second, it has to show 
to what extend we realize or fail to realize these norms in our 
factual practice. The critical theory is then basically 
understood as an explication of the principles and claims 
which are implicitly in use in actual social conflicts and 
which are the basis for the justification of claims of all actors. 
But this argument is based on the assumption that there exists 
a normative consensus within the society: that all actors in 
fact share some basic norms on which they rely if they 
criticise an established practice as injustice. And this 
assumption can be questioned because the ability of the 
actors to articulate their claims depends on their social and 
cultural capital (5, p154), because questions of social justice 
arise today in global contexts (6) and because the normative 
conceptions of different classes diverge depending on their 
role or function in a given social order. Different classes 
make different experiences corresponding to their position in 
a social structure and they need different belief-systems and 
different normative frameworks to interpret them and to 
articulate their claims. Thus, these conceptions also can’t 
take into account the naturalization of social institutions, the 
process through which these institutions appear as natural 
preconditions of actions. Bur more important for me is that 
justified critique remains in this conception always bound to 
the established norms and established ways of facing a social 
problem and it seems impossible that it will overcome it (8). 
Critique is conceived here as the unfolding of an existing 
normative potential. And this potential is seen as the 
unquestionable condition of justified claims of the actors and 
not as a product of their collective practice. 
2.2. Recognition as Affirmation 
According to Honneth acts of recognition react on already 
existing evaluative qualities of the individuals (9, p323). In 
this conception actors need to realize the evaluative qualities 
for which they claim recognition. Otherwise it becomes 
unclear how claims for recognition could be justified by 
practical reasons. This concept of recognition “permits us to 
account better for our intuition that recognition must be an 
act motivated by practical reasons: we thereby react in a 
correct or appropriate way to the reasons contained in the 
evaluative qualities that human beings possess in different 
respects.” (10, p331) 
But one problem here is that this conception can not take 
into account the sufferings which may arise if someone 
misses the requirements of the established criteria of 
recognizability, if someone fails to realize the qualities 
which are seen as valuable within a given order of 
recognition. This can be clarified by pointing to actual 
developments in the division of labour. With the 
marketization of the inner organization of companies 
workers become directly confronted with the demands of the 
markets (11, p34). This leads not only to an increase of 
internal concurrence, higher workload and pressure but also 
to a change of performance orientation. Within these 
structures market success becomes more important and this 
leads to a situation in which the performance and the 
commitment of the employees has to be proofed permanently. 
Their status becomes increasingly uncertain (12, p117). This 
marketization takes place on the background of the 
prekarization of working-conditions. Temporary and leasing 
contracts are implemented in central areas of production. For 
companies they are means for flexible reactions to changing 
market conditions. But for the employees this leads to 
growing insecurities which undermine long-term future 
planing and to an increase of concurrence between different 
groups (13, p52). 
The outlined developments converge in this respect that 
the status of the actors within the given order of recognition 
becomes increasingly uncertain. The recognizability has to 
be proofed permanently. Who wants to achieve social esteem 
in the sphere of social division of labour under the conditions 
of prekarization and marketization needs to struggle to fulfil 
permanently changing criteria of recognizability. In contrast 
to former periods of capitalist societies achievements of the 
past can no longer guarantee stable forms of recognition. The 
status in a given order of recognition remains always 
precarious. 
These changes in the dynamics of social conflicts reveal 
that criteria of recognition also determine the demands actors 
have to fulfil to get accepted within a given social order. In 
consequence, a critical reflection has to refer also to the 
demands these orders set as conditions of recognizability, as 
well as to the exclusions these conditions imply. Therefore 
the model of critique offered by Honneth is no longer 
sufficient: it is not enough to explain the normative grammar 
of social conflicts. Rather, a critical discussion and 
evaluation of basic assumptions implied in this grammar are 
necessary. Critique has to be conceived as critique based on 
these criteria of recognition as well as critique of these 
criteria itself. 
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2.3. Practical Identity 
I will come to the last point. To clarify the concept of a 
positive practical identity, the central criterion for social 
justice in his theory, Honneth goes back to analytical 
considerations about this topic, especially those of Harry G. 
Frankfurt (14, p327). According to this the practical identity 
of a person is given by her identification with her own wishes 
and abilities. It is an essential characteristic of human beings 
that they are not directly pushed by their wishes and desires, 
but that they are able to evaluate them, to identify with some 
of them and to thereby decide which ones should guide their 
course of action. Therefore they need some deep values, or as 
he calls them in other contexts “second order volutions”, 
which are the basis of this evaluation of their wishes. 
“Someone has a desire of the second order either when he 
wants simply to have a certain desire or when he wants a 
certain desire to be his will. In situations of the latter kind, I 
shall call his second order desires “second order volutions” 
[…]. Now it is having second order volutions […] that I 
regard as essential to being a person.” (15, p8) These 
evaluations or deep values constitute the character or 
practical identity of an actor, which guides him in his 
practical decision making. The theory of recognition 
completes this conception by claiming that persons need the 
affirmation or the recognition of others to build up such 
stable identifications and to develop a positive practical 
identity. With this argument, recognition given by others and 
by social institutions is the necessary condition for the 
formation of a practical identity and for the realization of 
social justice, but at the same time the social relations in 
which the actors recognize each other have no influence on 
the content of that practical identity. This point needs of 
course some clarification. What counts as recognizable, 
which qualities of the actors are affirmed by others and what 
can therefore constitute their practical identity, is always 
bound to an existing normative order. Thus, the actions and 
qualities we estimate change with the development of social 
institutions. But the problem remains that this concept of 
practical identity is nevertheless individualistic or 
self-centered. This means here that the content of the 
practical identity of an actor is only defined by his relations 
to his own qualities and not by his relationship to his social 
environment. In this conception, recognition is in danger of 
being used only for instrumental reasons. Social relations 
and institutions can be seen by the actor only as means for his 
own ends: for the realization and stabilization of his own 
practical identity. On the other side, insofar as personal 
identity is in many cases only conceived as an identification 
of the actor with his own qualities and abilities, it follows 
that the social context in which this positive personal identity 
is achieved remains arbitrary. This is not only an abstract 
philosophical or historical problem. To take a concrete 
example: Some companies established arrangements like the 
“election to the worker or colleague of the month”. They 
thereby want to compensate motivational problems of their 
employees and strengthen their bindings to the company, but 
without giving them higher salaries or more decision-making 
competences (16). In this case, the need to be recognized is 
used instrumentally: the company gives recognition, but it 
uses it as a means to motivate to the expected actions. 
The trouble here is that the affirmation of a certain 
personal identity may correspond to the existing expectations 
of the actor and ensure his integrity, but at the same time 
reaffirm the power relations of the social context in which 
this identity was formed. As long as the actors achieve some 
kind of positive practical identity at all, there can be no 
critical discussion on the question of how and by whom it is 
determined who receives recognition and for what. The 
actors do not appear here as participants in the constitution 
and organization of their social relations but as needy 
receivers of means for their individual ends. With that 
Honneth's theory of recognition reflects not sufficently the 
dependence of the isolated individual on established criteria 
of recognition. Especially if we have learned from the theory 
of recognition how much the self-understanding of 
individuals and social groups depends on the recognition of 
others, we have to take into account that this dependence 
could be exploited in asymmetrical relations in which only 
one side defines the criteria of recognition. 
I wanted to show in this part that Honneth tries to develop 
a critical theory of recognition which is based on legitmate 
norms and connected with existing experiences of social 
injustice and justified claims of social actors but that this 
conception remains at the same time insufficient because it 
needs to assume a shared normative consenus within a given 
society, because it is unable to question the established 
criteria of recognizability which are implied within a given 
normative order and because it can not take into account the 
various forms in which the dependence of the isolated 
individual on social recognition can be exploited in 
asymmetrical power-relations. 
3. Recognizing as Process of Experience 
In what follows I would like to outline an account which 
may help to overcome this dilemma and to determine social 
conditions of individual self-determination without masking 
the connection between power relations and practical 
identities. One central reason for the outlined problems 
seems to be that according to Honneths conception the 
normative evaluation of a social order depends on the 
question if it enables the actors to generate a positive 
practical identity and that this practical identity is conceived 
as a static identification with existing wishes and abilities. 
3.1. Critique and Self-reflection 
Therefore I want to shift the focus and to conceive 
recognizing not as an affirmation of an already existing 
identity, but as a social process. In this process the actors and 
social groups are always confronted with unintended social 
consequences of their actions for others and are therefore led 
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to a crisis and reformulation of their actual practical identity. 
My plea is to locate the criteria according to which we 
evaluate forms of recognition within this process of conflict, 
mutual critique and self-reflection and that it is necessary to 
distinguish to levels on which this process takes place: that of 
direct interaction (3.1.) and that of institutionalized social 
praxis (3.2.). I think that some passages of the early writings 
of Hegel can be interpreted as a critique of an individualistic 
understanding of practical identity. He also has a normative 
ideal of mutual recognition, but it is impossible to understand 
this ideal by referring to the level of individualistic practical 
identity alone. He rather shows that the realization of a 
practical identity depends on the organization and creation of 
common relations. This becomes clear in parts of his 
phenomenology of spirit, in which he unfolds what he calls 
the “pure concept of recognition”. The actors and their 
actions are always embedded in a shared social context. That 
is the reason why an action can never count only as an 
expression of the self-understanding of the actor; it is at the 
same time also the creation of a relationship to other persons. 
Who is engaged into practical decision making never only 
refers to his own desires, abilities and deep values. He must 
also reflect on his relations to other persons, their claims, 
rights, etc. This implies that every practical identity, and 
hence the conceptions which guide our practical decision 
making, include not only a concept of the own self but also a 
concept of the other self. “A self-consciousness exists for a 
self-consciousness. Only so is it fact self-consciousness; for 
only in this way does the unity of itself in its otherness 
become explicit for it.” (17, p110) The actor sees himself as a 
part in a common relation – and he sees the other as someone 
who sees himself also as a part in a common relation. The 
same idea was reformulated by John Dewey in the following 
way: “Each acts, insofar as the connection is known, in view 
of the connection. Individuals do the thinking, desiring and 
purposing, but what they think of is the consequences of their 
behavior upon that of others and that of others against 
themselves.” (18, p250) The content of practical identity is 
here defined by the relationship to other actors. But that 
means that the realization of his intentions never depends on 
him alone. The actor can realize his practical identity, which 
includes, as we saw, always a concept of his own self and 
those of others, only insofar as this practical identity 
corresponds to that of the others. The others need to interpret 
their relationship in the same way as he does. “Each sees the 
other do the same as it does; each […] does what it does only 
insofar as the other does the same. […] Thus the action has a 
double significance not only because it is directed against 
itself as well as against the other, but also because it is 
indivisibly the action of one as well as of the other.” (17, 
p112) 
But it cannot be taken for granted that all participants in a 
common relation have in fact a corresponding interpretation, 
that they in fact understand themselves and others in the 
same way as the others do. Thus it is not self-evident that 
there is or always will be such a shared interpretation of the 
common situation. But if there is no corresponding 
interpretation, if the actor understands her own claims, rights 
and duties as well as the claims, rights and duties of others 
differently from the others, then the realization of their 
practical identities fails. That means: if there is such a 
difference, then there will also be a difference between the 
intentions of the actor and the factual social consequences 
caused by her actions. I will call this the difference between 
acting and doing. But to elucidate this difference between 
acting and doing the actor needs the reactions and responses 
of the others. The other is needed to become aware of the 
social consequences caused by the action or of its social 
meaning. It is only in communication with others that we 
learn whether something that we did can count as the 
realization of our practical identities, which includes, as we 
saw, always a concept of our own self and those of the others, 
or if we missed our claims. This mutual critique is the 
precondition to explicate the existing action-guiding beliefs, 
to evaluate them and eventually to reformulate them. We 
cannot know what we are before we act, because we need the 
reactions and the critique of others to reflect upon the 
preconditions of our actions, especially action-guiding 
beliefs and dispositions. In consequence, the normative ideal 
of recognition has to be placed on two levels. First, its 
realization depends on the question of whether the actors 
remain open minded for such a form of mutual critique and 
for the questioning of their existing practical identities. 
Second, it depends on an institutionalization of such a 
process of mutual critique and the possibility of every actor 
to participate in this process equally.  
To summarize this point: In the proposed alternative, 
recognition is not an affirmation of what someone actually is. 
Recognizing is the process in which someone learns that she 
did something other than she expected. No-one can know 
who he or she is, before he has engaged in some kind of 
action. The reactions of others provoked by the social 
consequences of an action are the condition to achieve a 
deeper self-understanding, and this means to achieve a 
critical distance towards the own action-guiding beliefs and 
dispositions. Hence, recognizing is not an affirmation of an 
already existing practical identity but the possibility to 
become different. 
3.2. The Democratic Public 
This logic of conflict, mutual critique and self-reflection 
holds not only on the level of the individual, but also on that 
of collective habits and institutions. Even if these institutions 
are established with the best intentions, no one can foresee 
the whole range of social consequences they may provoke. 
So what I called the difference between acting and doing, 
between the intentions of the actor and the social 
consequences of the action, reappears here on a higher level. 
It may be conceived as a practical contradiction between the 
ends these institutions were created for and the social reality 
they produce. I think that it is possible to read Deweys 
writings of the inter war period as an account which shows 
that the institutions of a capitalist society produce these kinds 
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of practical contradictions. 
The rise of capitalism established new forms of far 
reaching economical interrelations and dependence. At the 
present the consequences of the economic associations 
which determine the live conditions of all of us are suffered, 
but not understood and still not kept under control. This leads 
to growing inequalities, uncertainties and to an exclusion 
form effective access to the means of cultivation. “It goes, 
then, without saying that agencies are not established which 
canalize the streams of social action and thereby regulate 
them. Hence the [democratic] publics are amorphous and 
unarticulated.” (18, p317) 
On this background Dewey shows how the values of 
classical liberalism, the principles of negative liberty and 
natural rights which once contributed to the liberation from 
feudal bondages now serve as a mean for the justification of 
social inequality and economic coercion and how the norms 
of equality and liberty which first seem to be realized in the 
practice of exchange produce by the means of this realization 
itself their own reversal, their transition to coercion and 
inequality. Above all, in identifying the extension of liberty 
in all of its modes with the extension of their particular brand 
of economic liberty, they completely failed to anticipate the 
bearing of private control of the means of production and 
distribution upon the effective liberty of the masses in 
industry as well as in cultural goods (19, p29) 
What follows for Dewey from this analysis of his present 
situation? First, we have to realize to what extend elder 
beliefs and principles are misleading or changed their social 
meaning under new circumstances. Freedom can’t only be 
conceived as negative freedom, as the freedom to exchange 
products, and equality not only the juridical equality of 
abstract rights. Rather, it has to include the equal ability and 
power of every actor to contribute to the constitution of the 
common social relations. The concepts of freedom and 
equality refer then to the collective and conscious 
constitution of the common social relations. 
The actual practical contradiction between the ends these 
institutions were created for and the social reality they 
produce has to lead to a critical reflection and reformulation 
of these ends itself. On the background of these experiences 
it becomes clear that the previously existing norms have to 
be reformulated. In consequence the guiding normative 
criteria of critique can not be bound to an already existing 
normative consensus or determined from the outset or in 
advance, they must instead be developed in this 
reconstruction of the existing practical contradictions. The 
way in which these practical contradictions are explained 
shows also that the structures which first seemed to be 
natural preconditions for the actors are in fact the product of 
their actions. Insofar it gives a reason and an explanation of 
the possibility to overcome the existing social structures. 
According to this the concept of social justice needs to be 
developed in historical experiences in which new hypothesis 
are build on the background of actual practical contradictions 
and suffering. „But to say that [...] men have been moved by 
what they suffer to search out new and better courses of 
action is to speak very veraciously.“ (20, p9) That what we 
mean if we talk about social justice can only be developed on 
the background of experiences of practical failures. 
Second, we have to ask how to organize this elucidation of 
the existing practical contradictions between the ends the 
established institutions were created for and the social reality 
they produce on an institutional level and how to empower 
the actors to reorganize the institutions under which they live 
in consequence of such an elucidation. According to Dewey 
this is the task of a democratic public. In this sense the 
creation of a democratic public which is able to control the 
existing economical associations and to overcome its 
inequalities and coercions is still a task before us. The 
democratic public has to be conceived as the realm in which 
such a common elucidation of problematic social 
consequences of the existing institutions can take place. This 
elucidation is then the background for a critical reflection on, 
and a reformulation of the guiding norms of these institutions. 
As on the level of the individual, the reflection on social 
consequences is the condition for a critical distance towards 
the existing social norms. Such a democratic public has to 
give all actors the possibility to articulate how they are 
affected by the existing institutions and to formulate claims 
for a rearrangement. “The public consists of all those who 
are affected by the indirect consequences of transactions to 
such an extend that it is deemed necessary to have those 
consequences systematically cared for.” (18, p245-46) 
Without such a discussion the results will be “fatally tainted 
with subjectivity” (21, p172). Therefore the justification of 
the validity claims of our social norms implies not only the 
freedom of speech and thought but also the abolition of 
economical and political inequalities which block the 
interests of oppressed classes form serious considerations. 
This includes also a strong argument against the leadership 
of experts well known in our present days. Because every 
group of experts is unable to define a common good in 
isolation. “There is a moral tragedy inherent in [such] efforts 
to further the common good which prevent the result from 
being either good or common—not good, because it is at the 
expense of the active growth of those to be helped, and not 
common because these have no share in bringing the results 
about.” (22, p347) 
But the creation of a democratic public requires also an 
end of private control of the means of production and it 
therefore includes the socialization of key industries, natural 
resources and infrastructure, redistribution and the 
democratization of the economy (23, p441). The scope of a 
democratic public can not be limited to a certain set of 
institutions, but it has to be expanded to all of them, 
especially the economy. “The idea of democracy is a wider 
and fuller idea than can be exemplified in the state even at its 
best. To be realized it must affect all modes of human 
association, the family, school, industry, religion.” (18, 
p325) 
Third, we have to see in general that the normative 
principles which form our social relations are only 
provisional hypotheses and are only justified if they are the 
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outcome of democratic discussions and decision-making 
processes. This means that this ideal of recognizing refers 
not to a perfect set of institutions but to the possibility to 
correct mistakes. The normative ideal of recognition has to 
be conceived as a social process in which social groups are 
confronted with unintended social consequences of their 
institutions and are therefore led to a crisis and reformulation 
of the norms guiding these institutions. “The formation of 
state must be an experimental process.” (18, p256) 
The difference to the conception of Honneth should be 
clear. For him, every claim for recognition has to be justified 
by referring to the existing normative order. In the alternative 
I proposed in this paper, recognizing is the process through 
which the existing social norms and institutions guided by 
these norms are questioned and reformulated. In 
consequence, critique refers to blockades of this process of 
experience in which existing practical identities and 
institutionalized rules are questioned and reformulated. 
4. Conclusions 
Recognizing is the process of mutual critique which 
enables the actors to achieve a critical distance towards their 
action-guiding beliefs and dispositions. It is the possibility to 
become different. Blockades of experience may be 
conceived then as a disruption from such a common 
elucidation of the social consequences of established forms 
of action. Such a disruption occurs if some actors are 
excluded from the process of mutual critique and if a fixed 
identity is ascribed to them by others independently of their 
own articulations. Such a disruption occurs also if some 
normative rules which are embedded within a given practice 
and which implicitly guide the practical decision making of 
the actors, appear as natural preconditions of actions. An 
action guided by these rules remains dependent on social 
conditions and it contributes to the reproduction of a social 
structure without a conscious control of this reproduction. 
Recognizing is in contrast to this the process in which the 
reactions of others provoked by the social consequences of 
an action are the condition to achieve a critical distance 
towards the own action-guiding beliefs and dispositions. It is 
the process through which the existing social norms and 
institutions guided by these norms are questioned and 
reformulated. But then the realization of this ideal of mutual 
recognition depends on the organization of this common 
elucidation of the existing practical contradictions and the 
empowerment of the actors to reorganize the institutions 
under which they live. Democracy has to be conceived as a 
social process in which social groups are confronted with 
new social problems or unintended social consequences of 
their institutions and are therefore led to a crisis and to a 
common reformulation of the norms and beliefs guiding 
these institutions. “The end of democracy is a radical end. 
For it is an end that has not been adequately realized in any 
country at any time. It is radical because it requires great 
change in existing social institutions, economic, legal, and 
cultural.” (24, pp298-99) 
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